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Abstract The ubiquity of inner awareness thesis (UIA) states that all conscious
states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very
state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of
their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim
that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ (or ‘pre-
reflective self-consciousness’) to be a constant presence in their non-introspective
experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are char-
acterised by inner awareness, and maintain that inner awareness is only gained when
they explicitly introspect. Each camp has put forward a range of arguments designed
to resolve this dispute, but I argue that none of these arguments has genuine dia-
lectical purchase. This leads me to develop a compromise position that trades on the
contribution that affordances can make to our phenomenology. According to the
Affordance Model of inner awareness, all conscious states of normal adult humans
are characterised by an affordance of introspectability. In line with the UIA-Skeptic,
non-introspective experiences are not characterised by inner awareness. But against
the traditional UIASkeptic, non-introspective experiences are characterised by an
awareness of the opportunity for introspection. On this view, our capacity to gain
inner awareness of our current experience is a ubiquitous feature of our phenom-
enology. I show how the Affordance Model respects the driving phenomenological
intuitions of both the UIA-Backers and the traditional UIA-Skeptics, and suggest
that it is able to explain why neither camp achieves an accurate description of how
inner awareness figures in their phenomenology.
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1 A recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement
1.1 Is inner awareness ubiquitous?
Is your conscious ‘outer awareness’ of the world always accompanied by a
conscious ‘inner awareness’ of that very experience? This is a question about your
phenomenology—about what it’s like to undergo the experience you are having.
The same question can be expressed in a number of different ways: when you
experience some event do you also experience your experience?; do your conscious
states involve a self-consciousness of that very state?; when you are perceptually
aware of your environment, are you also aware of your awareness? Introspection
certainly seems to yield awareness of one’s own experience, but the question is
whether your non-introspective experiences are characterised by a kind of inner
awareness too. One camp answers ‘yes’ to these questions: they report that inner
awareness is a ubiquitous feature of their phenomenology. The other camp answers
‘no’ to these questions: they report that their phenomenological reflection reveals no
such ubiquitous property.
One possibility here is that both sides are getting their own phenomenology right:
the yes-camp has one kind of experience, the no-camp has a different kind, and both
camps are accurately reporting what their own experiences are like. Although this
suggestion has the attraction of making everybody right, I think all sides can agree
that it is wildly implausible. If there is such a thing as this non-introspective inner
awareness, why would it be a ubiquitous feature of some people’s experience but
not others? The more likely situation is that both camps have the same kind of
experience but at least one camp is describing their phenomenology inaccurately. So
the real question is whether the following phenomenological thesis is true:
The Ubiquity of Inner Awareness Thesis (UIA): all conscious states of
normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very
state.
Those who affirm this phenomenological thesis are UIA-Backers. Those who do not
affirm this thesis, including those who actively deny it, are UIA-Skeptics.1 The
UIA-Backers and UIA-Skeptics offer conflicting views of what our conscious
experience is like.
UIA holds that we are always aware of our concurrent experience. It is important
to recognise that this thesis does not place demanding constraints on the way in
which we are aware of our experience. Our inner awareness does not, for instance,
need to be an attentive awareness. Nor need it involve the application of concepts to
our own experience.2 Nor does it have to be an objectual awareness—that is, an
1 UIA-Skeptics can still hold that there is a constitutive connection between consciousness and awareness
(Gertler 2012, p. 451). The claim they are resisting is that conscious states must be characterised by an
awareness of that very state.
2 Consequently, inner awareness must not be confused with making judgements about one’s concurrent
experience. In principle, you can have a judgement-free awareness of your experience just as you can
have a judgement-free awareness of your environment.
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awareness that presents its target as an entity that exists independently of our being
aware of it. It may not even require an egological representation of ourselves as the
subjects of that experience—a state might be self-conscious in the sense of yielding
consciousness of itself without being self-conscious in the sense of yielding
consciousness of the subject that bears it.3 So if our inner awareness is inattentive,
non-conceptual, non-objectual and non-egological that would be quite consistent
with the truth of UIA. One constraint that UIA does place on our inner awareness is
that it be conscious awareness. Some take ‘awareness’ to be synonymous with
‘consciousness’ but others allow awareness to come in non-conscious forms. The
ubiquity of non-conscious inner awareness—a possibility I will consider in due
course—would not entail the truth of UIA. By ‘awareness’ I shall mean conscious
awareness. Some of the more demanding features mentioned might be required for
introspective awareness of one’s experience, but UIA does not claim that all
experiences are introspected.4 Kriegel holds that introspection brings into focal
attention an inner awareness that is otherwise only a peripheral aspect of our
experience (Kriegel 2009a, p. 183). Zahavi draws attention to a crucial distinction
made in the phenomenological tradition between reflective and pre-reflective self-
consciousness (e.g. 2006, p. 5). Reflective self-consciousness is achieved only when
we introspect, but the suggestion is that there is a more primitive pre-reflective self-
consciousness that is a constant background presence in experience.5
1.2 Theoretical implications of UIA
UIA is an interesting thesis about the phenomenology of normal adult humans.
More than that though, it has significant implications for our theorising about
consciousness. Importantly, some have used UIA as the basis for bolder claims
about the nature of consciousness. First, one might draw an abductive inference
from UIA to the unrestricted thesis that all possible conscious experiences are
characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. On this view, UIA offers us
an insight into the invariant structure of conscious experience, allowing us to
3 Some UIA-Backers such as Zahavi (2004, 2006) claim that awareness of one’s experience does require
a kind of awareness of oneself, though this awareness involves a primitive sense of ‘mineness’ rather than
a rich conception of the self. This issue is helpfully discussed by Zahavi and Kriegel (forthcoming). For
current purposes I can remain neutral on this claim.
4 I take it that the crucial distinction between introspective and non-introspective awareness can be made
without committing to any particular theory of introspection. The important point is that there is a
phenomenological difference between what it’s like to have the non-introspective awareness cited by
UIA-Backers and what it’s like to reflect explicitly on your experience.
5 Zahavi holds that all the major figures in the phenomenological tradition—Brentano, Husserl,
Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur—advocated some version of this view (2004, p. 82), though
there is room for debate on Zahavi’s reading of these figures. Is Kriegel’s ‘peripheral inner awareness’ the
same thing as the phenomenologists’ ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’? There are some subtle
differences between the two accounts (see especially Kriegel 2009a, p. 362; Zahavi 2004, pp. 79–80;
Zahavi and Kriegel forthcoming). For instance, while the former is characterised as an intentional relation
the latter is generally regarded as non-intentional. However, rather than getting side-tracked by this fiddly
internal debate, I will treat Kriegel and the phenomenologists as allies who wish to defend at least some
version of UIA.
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conclude that the experiences of abnormal adult humans, of human infants and of
conscious non-human animals must also all be characterised by inner awareness.
Second, from this unrestricted phenomenological thesis one might draw an
inference to the metaphysical conclusion that inner awareness is what makes
conscious mental states conscious at all. This comes out vividly in Kriegel’s self-
representationalist theory of consciousness according to which a mental state is
conscious in virtue of suitably representing itself (Kriegel 2009a). Neither of these
inferences is beyond reproach. Mehta, for instance, casts serious doubt on both
(2013, pp. 361–363). But the fact that UIA is used to drive such substantive
theoretical claims gives us all the more reason to assess its credibility.
Even if UIA is not used to motivate theoretical claims about consciousness, it can
certainly be used to test such claims. Higher-order representation (HOR) theories
claim that we are aware of a mental state M only when we suitably represent it via
some distinct higher-order mental state M* (e.g. Rosenthal 1986). Some advocates
of UIA have suggested that HOR theories are incompatible with UIA (Kriegel
2009a, pp. 124–125). If UIA is true, we are not just aware of M but also of our
awareness of M. To accommodate this the HOR theorist might posit some third
mental state M** in virtue of which we are aware of M* representing M. But this
merely pushes the problem up a level, leaving us unaware of the awareness
bestowed by M**. Assuming we can rule out an infinite hierarchy of mental states,
it looks like the truth of UIA is at odds with the truth of HOR theory.
‘One-state’ theorists have attempted to avoid this objection whilst maintaining
something of the spirit of HOR theory. Echoing a move made by Brentano (1874/
1924), they suggest that consciousness involves a single mental state that represents
both the world and itself. The hope is that such reflexive representations can yield
awareness of our own awareness. This strategy has been developed in a number of
competing ways, and the resulting theories can again be tested by asking whether
they accommodate the truth of UIA. Kriegel, for instance, suggests that this
reflexive representation is achieved when a lower- and higher-order mental state
appropriately combine to form a single complex mental state. But there is a genuine
worry that this kind of internal representational division would entail the same kind
of regress that threatens HOR theory.6
The truth of UIA would be a crucial datum for theorising about consciousness.
Conversely, if UIA is false this too would have important theoretical consequences,
cutting off any lines of argument premised on UIA. My aim in this paper is not to
evaluate theoretical claims about consciousness, nor to assess the validity of any
inferences made from UIA to some theoretical conclusion. Rather, my aim is to look
closely at this putative phenomenological datum itself, putting aside any theoretical
matters that might cloud our assessment.
6 Kriegel (2009a, pp. 126–127) argues that his proposal avoids any such regress but critics such as Levine
(in conversation) argue otherwise. Faced with these worries a one-state theorist might hold that conscious
states have an unstructured reflexivity. The worry here though is that the prospects of naturalising
reflexive mental representations that lack internal structure are dim (Kriegel 2009a, p. 102).
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1.3 Strategies for resolving the dispute
UIA-Backers claim to have phenomenological justification for their belief in UIA.7
Kriegel holds that ‘…peripheral inner awareness is simply phenomenologically
manifest’ (2009a, p. 50) and Zahavi suggests that accurate phenomenological
description is ‘the best argument to be found’ for thinking that non-introspective
experience is characterised by pre-reflective self-consciousness (2006, p. 24). But
UIA-Skeptics claim not to find any such feature in their experience. Mehta reports
‘[w]hen I conduct phenomenological investigation into any peripheral awareness of
my experiences, attempting to set aside any theoretical prejudices, I haven’t a clue
whether I’ve ever had such peripheral awareness’ (2013, p. 364). And Gennaro
states ‘[i]t does not seem to me that I am consciously aware (in any sense) of my
own experience when I am, say, consciously attending to a play or the task of
building a bookcase’ (2008, p. 48). Schear (2009, p. 100) reports that his polling on
the matter reveals no consensus for or against UIA and my own informal polling
reveals much the same.
Faced with this recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement, what can we do to
resolve the dispute? Two broad strategies present themselves. The via positiva
strategy is to establish indirect evidence for UIA. On this strategy, UIA-Backers
identify particular features of experience—features that their opponents can agree
are genuine—and then argue that UIA is the best explanation of these features. The
challenge for UIA-Skeptics is to resist these inferences. The via negativa strategy is
to explain why one side has got their own phenomenology wrong. The task for the
UIA-Backers is to explain why the UIA-Skeptics have failed to recognise a
ubiquitous feature of their phenomenology, while the task for the UIA-Skeptics is to
explain why the UIA-Backers are under the illusion that their experiences have a
property that they in fact lack.
In Sect. 2 I explore the three leading implementations of the via positiva strategy.
I argue that, in all three cases, the UIA-Skeptics can offer their own credible
explanations of the data cited without having to posit UIA. Moving on to the via
negativa strategy, I consider four proposals put forward by UIA-Backers designed
to explain away skepticism about UIA, and four proposals put forward by UIA-
Skeptics designed to explain away any attraction to UIA. I argue that no proposal
takes seriously enough the intuitions of the opposing camp. I conclude that none of
the moves made in the dispute over UIA have the dialectical purchase needed to
break the phenomenological stalemate.
In Sect. 4 I introduce my own model of inner awareness which offers a novel
alternative to the entrenched positions in this debate. I suggest that all conscious
experiences of normal adult humans are characterised by an affordance of
introspectability. That is, ordinary non-introspective experience does not involve
the subject being aware of her experience but does involve the subject being aware
of her potential to become aware of her experience. This ‘Affordance Model’ denies
7 One might instead make a conceptual case for UIA, arguing that inner awareness is built into the very
concept of consciousness. I am concerned only with the phenomenological route to UIA, and doubt that a
serious conceptual case can be made.
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UIA, officially putting me in the UIA-Skeptic camp. Unlike the established
skeptical positions though, the Affordance Model reflects something of the spirit of
UIA. As such I regard it as a compromise position that, instead of simply adopting a
hard-line stance, takes seriously the intuitions of both camps. Furthermore, I argue
that this model is much better equipped than hard-line views to explain why its
opponents have got their own phenomenology wrong.
2 The via positiva strategy
2.1 Three via positiva arguments for UIA
(i) Reportability Whenever we are in a conscious mental state, we are easily able to
report on that very mental state when prompted.8 This is a datum that the UIA-
Skeptic ought to accept: it is a highly plausible claim about consciousness, and its
plausibility does not rely on any presupposition that UIA is true. UIA-Backers argue
that the best explanation of this datum is that all consciousness includes a
peripheral/pre-reflective consciousness of itself. Zahavi, drawing explicitly on
Sartre, argues as follows:
If I am engaged in some conscious activity, such as the reading of a story, my
attention is neither on myself nor on my activity of reading, but on the story.
But if my reading is interrupted by someone asking me what I am doing, I
reply immediately that I am (and have for some time been) reading; and the
self-consciousness on the basis of which I answer the question is not
something acquired at just that moment but a consciousness of myself which
has been present to me all along. (2004, p. 84)
Since the experience is one of immersion in the story, it would be implausible to
explain the report by saying that the subject was explicitly introspecting his
experience whilst reading. Since the report is immediate and effortless, it would be
implausible to say that the report was made on the basis of an introspection
performed by the subject after he was interrupted. We are thus encouraged toward
the conclusion that the subject’s experience of the story is characterised by a non-
introspective awareness of that very experience. And since we (normal adult
humans) are always able to report on our conscious states, we can infer that our
experiences are always characterised by this inner awareness.9 So regardless of her
prior phenomenological intuitions, the UIA-Skeptic ought to infer that UIA is true
after all.
(ii) No Surprises At present you are, I assume, visually perceiving the words
before you. Now start to introspect. What do you find? Presumably you find that you
are undergoing a visual experience as of reading the words before you. I imagine
8 Note, the claim that we are easily able to make reliable reports about our experience is consistent with
these reports sometimes involving errors. There is no presupposition of infallibility.
9 Effectively the same argument is made by Kriegel (2009a, p. 305).
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that this doesn’t come as news to you—I’m not surprised that you find this
experience on introspecting so it would be very odd if you were surprised! This is
representative of a general truth about introspection: when we introspect we are
unsurprised to find just the experience we do. Perhaps introspection can reveal
specific properties of our experience that are surprising, but it remains the case that
finding the experience itself never feels like a substantive discovery.
This is a datum about consciousness—specifically about introspective con-
sciousness—that the UIA-Skeptic ought to accept. UIA-Backers suggest that the
best explanation of this datum is that we are already aware of our experience prior to
introspecting it. Kriegel explains that ‘[i]f conscious states were states we were
aware of, then they would not be surprising to notice when we turned our attention
onto them’ (2009a, p. 307). Introspection cannot surprise us because it doesn’t make
us aware of anything we weren’t aware of prior to introspecting. On Kriegel’s view,
introspection simply brings into focus something of which we were already aware
peripherally. Or, in Zahavi’s framework, introspection brings into reflective
awareness that which was already given to us pre-reflectively. Thus the ‘no
surprises’ datum ought to convince the UIA-Skeptic that UIA is true.
(iii) Nothing Dramatic The last via positiva argument I will consider is based on
an observation about how it feels to introspect. When you make the transition from
perceiving your current environment to introspecting your current perceptual
experience, does it feel as though you are introducing a wholly new representation
into your experience? Most would say that introspection feels less dramatic than
this. Kriegel holds that ‘…introspecting feels more like a phenomenologically light
shifting around of attention than like a dramatic mental act that produces a
completely new awareness’ (2009a, p. 186). Introspection is not like opening our
eyes, revealing visible objects of which we were previously unaware. Rather,
introspection is more like visually attending to an object that we were previously
seeing inattentively.
The UIA-Backers explain this datum by saying that introspection really doesn’t
produce any new awareness: it seems undramatic because it is undramatic.
Introspecting is a modest shifting around of attention, or a subtle transition from
pre-reflective to reflective awareness. In other words, introspection merely enhances
the inner awareness that is already contained in our non-introspective experience.
So given this datum about how the act of introspection feels, the UIA-Skeptic ought
to infer that UIA is true.10
2.2 The skeptical response
How can the UIA-Skeptic respond to these via positiva arguments? One option is to
reject the putative data, but this would come at the cost of having little dialectical
force against those who find the data plausible. A better route for the skeptic is to
10 Although the ‘nothing dramatic’ datum is clearly linked to the ‘no surprises’ datum, it remains
important to distinguish them. There being ‘nothing dramatic’ about introspection pertains to how the act
of introspection feels when we perform it. By contrast, there being ‘no surprises’ in introspection pertains
to the epistemic relationship we appear to have to the introspected experience revealed by that act.
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find a way of accommodating the data whilst avoiding UIA. UIA may well explain
the data cited, but is it the best explanation? If the UIA-Skeptic can provide
explanations of the data that are at least as plausible as those provided by the UIA-
Backer, then the inference to UIA can be blocked.11
(i) Reportability The fact that we can report on our concurrent conscious activity
indicates that we have knowledge of our conscious states as we undergo them.
Claiming, as the UIA-Backer does, that we are aware of our concurrent conscious
state is one way of accounting for this epistemic situation. But it is not the only way.
At any given time, we have a great deal of non-conscious knowledge—things that
we know but which do not figure in our experience. As Schear explains:
…the move from an epistemological self-relation (knowing what I am doing
in doing what I am doing) to a phenomenological self-relation (experiencing
myself doing what I am doing in doing what I am doing) is a move, and it is
not an obvious move to make. (2009, p. 101)
Avoiding this unwarranted move, the UIA-Skeptic can explain the reportability of
conscious states by saying that our conscious states are accompanied by a
concurrent non-conscious knowledge of that very state (Thomasson 2005). Here we
have a perfectly credible explanation of the data cited that involves no appeal to
inner awareness.12
(ii) No Surprises Once the UIA-Skeptic has posited an ever-present non-
conscious knowledge of our concurrent conscious state, she is also in a position to
accommodate the ‘no surprises’ datum. When we introspect we are unsurprised by
the experience we find because we already knew about that experience prior to
introspection. The UIA-Backer assumes that this knowledge takes the form of inner
awareness, but the UIA-Skeptic can reject that assumption and hold that the relevant
knowledge is non-conscious.13 Consider again the introspection of your perceptual
experience of the words before you. This perceptual experience is unsurprising to
you because you already knew you were having this experience before you began to
introspect. But since this knowledge was non-conscious, your non-introspective
11 A possible alternative strategy for the UIA-Skeptic is to deny that UIA is even able to account for the
data. If UIA doesn’t offer a genuine explanation of the data, then UIA-Skeptics are not under any
obligation to provide a better explanation. Such a pessimistic view of UIA is hard to defend, and I cannot
find any UIA-Skeptics who have adopted this view. Zahavi and Kriegel (forthcoming) attribute such a
view to Schear (2009), but on my reading of Schear he makes no such claim.
12 The UIA-Backer might respond that the only way we could have knowledge of our concurrent
experience is if that experience was characterised by an inner awareness (Caston 2006; Zahavi and
Kriegel forthcoming). This is, however, a bold theoretical claim that is too contentious to be deployed
with any real force against the UIA-Skeptic.
13 Should this knowledge be characterised in terms of an occurrent non-conscious mental state
representing one’s concurrent experience, or in terms of a latent disposition to form such a representation
when prompted? Schear (2009, p. 100) appeals to ‘…an ordinary colloquial sense of the verb ‘to
know’…’, which I take to be neutral on the occurrent/dispositional question. Zahavi and Kriegel
(forthcoming) argue that the dispositional account is explanatorily vacuous. If this objection sticks, the
UIA-Skeptic can specifically commit to the occurrent-state version.
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experience of the words was exhausted by your outer awareness of the world. There
is no need to infer that inner awareness was contributing to your phenomenology.14
(iii) Nothing Dramatic A UIA-Skeptic might adopt a model of introspection
according to which we observe our own experiences when, and only when, we begin
to introspect (e.g. Armstrong 1968). The fact that introspection does not feel like
such a ‘dramatic’ act would count against such a view. Most UIA-Skeptics,
however, would not wish to adopt such a model of introspection. A number of more
promising models of introspection are available according to which introspection is,
in the relevant sense of the term, an undramatic act. For instance, Thomasson draws
on the influential Husserlian notion of bracketing:
…the idea of bracketing in phenomenology is to preserve both force and
content of the original experience…but use the brackets to disconnect it from
our ordinary world-directed concern so that it can be studied as a phenomenon,
a way of experiencing the world, rather than being put to use in our
engagement with the world… (2005, p. 125)
She goes on to describe this transformation of our consciousness as ‘…a shift of
attitude within our experiences: regarding them merely as appearances, as
representing contents, rather than simply using them to acquire information about
the world’ (2005, pp. 126–127).15 If accurate, this would explain why introspection
does not feel dramatic without presupposing that inner awareness is present in the
background of our non-introspective experiences.16 The UIA-Skeptic need not
commit herself to the Husserlian model of phenomenological knowledge here.
Rather, she can make the weaker claim that there is no need to posit UIA to explain
the ‘nothing dramatic’ datum since alternative models are available with just as
much explanatory promise.17
14 A subtly different UIA-Skeptic account of the ‘no surprises’ datum is offered by Gertler (2012,
pp. 452–453). Though credible, it trades on contentious claims about qualitative awareness that would
lead us too far astray.
15 This view of introspection is closely tied to the so-called transparency of experience. Many believe
that when we introspect we do not become aware of some new set of qualities belonging to our
experience. Rather, we become aware of the same old worldly qualities in some new way. The
transparency of experience is sometimes thought to be at odds with UIA (e.g. Gennaro 2008), but Zahavi
and Kriegel (forthcoming) go some way toward assuaging these worries.
16 Confusingly, Husserl and Thomasson use the concept of bracketing as part of a rejection of
‘introspectionist’ views of how we achieve knowledge of our experience. They take ‘introspection’ to be
a quasi-perceptual inner observation, and rightly hold that bracketing is not introspective (see Thomasson
2005, p. 116). However, in this paper I am using the term ‘introspection’ more liberally to refer to the act
that we perform—whatever it is—when we reflect on our experience. On this use of the term, it is quite
coherent to say that the act of bracketing is one and the same as the act of introspection.
17 One interesting alternative to the bracketing account is Dretske’s (1994) ‘displaced perception’ model
of introspection that shares the spirit of Husserl and Thomasson’s position but avoids the slightly
contentious notion of bracketing. A further alternative would be to hold that introspection feels
undramatic because it is the act of bringing into consciousness knowledge that was already present
unconsciously, and not an act that yields any new object of knowledge. This would tally nicely with the
responses offered to the first two pieces of data discussed.
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The via positiva strategy has failed to tip the balance in favour of UIA. Although
credible explanations of the data cited can be provided by UIA, it is far from clear
that these are the best explanations as plausible competing explanations are
available that do not posit UIA. As such, the UIA-Backer has said nothing that
ought to convince the UIA-Skeptic to switch sides. In fact, it seems that preferences
for one explanation over another are governed by one’s prior attitude toward the
truth of UIA. So, far from providing an objective way of resolving the dispute, the
via positiva strategy has no real dialectical purchase, leaving us with the same
recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement with which we started.18 Although my
review of the via positiva strategy is far from comprehensive I think it offers a fair
assessment of what the literature has to offer, so for the remainder of the paper I will
assume that no existing version of the strategy succeeds.
3 The via negativa strategy
The aim of the via negativa strategy is to establish a credible explanation of why the
opposing camp has ended up misdescribing their own phenomenology. A successful
implementation of this strategy must cast serious doubt on the opposing position and
ought to shake opponents’ confidence in their phenomenological reports. This
strategy does not seem to have been implemented with any great enthusiasm by
UIA-Backers. Kriegel introduces four quick considerations designed to explain
away resistance to UIA (2009a, pp. 51–52), but I will argue that none of these
considerations has any real force against the UIA-Skeptic. The strategy has been
adopted much more enthusiastically by UIA-Skeptics. I will focus on arguments put
forward by Thomasson (2006), Gennaro (2008), Schear (2009) and Mehta (2013),
and again will conclude that they fail to break the dialectical stalemate between the
two camps.
One option available to both sides is to say that their opponents are simply
reflecting on their phenomenology badly. But this argument would clearly lack any
dialectical purchase as the opposing camp can simply turn the same argument
around. Furthermore, since it is implausible that an opponent is a bad phenome-
nological investigator across the board, it is unwarranted to suggest that she is
making a careless mistake in the case of her investigation of inner awareness. I think
two general lessons can be extracted from this:
(I) A successful via negativa argument cannot be applicable against both
camps with equal force.
(II) A successful via negativa argument cannot attribute to the opponent a
kind of mistake that she is not disposed to make in contexts other than
the assessment of UIA.
18 Other via positiva arguments for UIA are available beyond the three influential arguments I have
considered (see especially Kriegel 2009a). I suggest that these arguments fall short in the same way as
those discussed: whatever data is cited in favour of UIA, an alternative skeptical explanation of the data is
always available, so the dialectical stalemate persists.
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Although these two rules are quite demanding, a proper appreciation of what is
required of the via negativa strategy reveals them to be appropriate. Consider a
scenario in which we have a compelling positive theoretical argument for our
preferred position. This would leave us with the residual task of explaining why our
opponent has got things wrong. In such a situation, the demands placed on our
explanation would be relatively weak. It wouldn’t matter, for instance, if our
opponent could generate an inverted explanation of why our intuitions are wrong
because we would not be relying on our intuitions to make our case: rather, our
intuitions would be backed up by a compelling theoretical argument. It is important
to recognise that this is not the scenario in which we currently find ourselves. I have
argued already that theoretical considerations do not resolve the debate. Conse-
quently, the via negativa strategy needs to provide a self-standing argument for
one’s preferred position. In light of this, the two demanding rules I have introduced
are quite appropriate. I will argue that none of the via negativa arguments that have
been put forward manage to satisfy both rules.
3.1 Four via negativa arguments against the UIA-Skeptic
(i) Unimpressiveness Kriegel notes that ‘…peripheral inner awareness is not as
phenomenologically impressive as, say, the qualitative character of color experi-
ence. But the common tendency to take color experiences as the gold standard of
phenomenology…may set the bar too high’ (2009a, p. 51). The suggestion is that
UIA-Skeptics fail to notice the inner awareness that characterises their experience
because it is such a subtle feature. This may well explain why inner awareness is
harder to spot than more striking aspects of our phenomenology, such as the reddish
quality of our visual experience. But why should we think that the UIA-Skeptic has
carelessly failed to consider the more subtle aspects of his phenomenology when he
searches for inner awareness? After all, the UIA-Skeptic isn’t inclined to deny the
existence of other subtle aspects of his phenomenology. Gennaro, for example,
reports that a peripheral awareness of his thoughts makes a subtle contribution to his
phenomenology (2008, p. 44), so why would he fail to recognise the subtle presence
of peripheral inner awareness? The argument from unimpressiveness breaks the
second rule identified above: it attributes to the UIA-Skeptic a kind of mistake—in
this case a failure to recognise unimpressive features of their phenomenology—that
he is not disposed to make in contexts other than the examination of inner
awareness. Perhaps Kriegel could supplement his argument with an explanation of
why the UIA-Skeptic makes this mistake specifically in the context of inner
awareness, but it would then be this supplementary move that is doing the real
philosophical work, rendering the appeal to unimpressiveness somewhat redundant.
(ii) Unintrospectability Kriegel’s next line of argument is that we normally
identify features of our phenomenology by attending to them. In the case of
peripheral inner awareness though, ‘…if we attempt to turn our attention to it, it
inevitably transforms into focal inner awareness’ (2009a, p. 52). We can translate
the same point into Zahavi’s framework: our pre-reflective self-consciousness
cannot be revealed by explicit reflection on our experience, because such reflection
transforms our self-consciousness from pre-reflective to reflective. If inner
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awareness is unintrospectable, how do UIA-Backers like Kriegel know that it is
there? Kriegel suggests that we have ‘…a general impression of peripheral inner
awareness from our ordinary, non-introspective consciousness’ (2009b, p. 375).
This account might explain why peripheral inner awareness is harder to spot than
features of phenomenology that can simply be attended to explicitly. Again though,
the problem is that UIA-Skeptics don’t generally make the mistake of denying the
existence of inattentive aspects of their phenomenology. Mehta, for instance,
acknowledges that he has an inattentive awareness of his keyboard as he types
(2013, p. 364). As such, Kriegel still owes us an explanation of why the UIA-
Skeptic would make such a mistake when it comes to peripheral inner awareness.
(iii) Background Hum Kriegel notes that ‘[i]t is in general difficult to notice even
stimuli that are constant for a relatively short time, such as the hum of the
refrigerator pump. If peripheral inner awareness is indeed ubiquitous, its constancy
throughout our waking life would account for the fact that it is so phenomeno-
logically elusive’ (2009a, p. 52). Our inner awareness is thus like a humming fridge
that never stops. Since we never have an experience lacking this phenomenological
feature, we are unable to contrast our conscious states and bring our peripheral inner
awareness ‘into sharper relief’ (2009a, p. 52). The problem with this line of
argument should be clear: although it might explain why peripheral inner awareness
is harder to spot than features that vary between experiences, this does not explain
the UIA-Skeptic’s mistake. Presumably the skeptics aren’t such careless phenom-
enologists that they would deny the existence of the background hum of the fridge,
even when prompted by opponents who claim that such a humming is present. So
why would they be making an analogous mistake in the case of inner awareness?
Overall, Kriegel’s attempts to implement the via negativa strategy are
inadequate. They may well explain someone’s initial resistance to UIA—which
is, to be fair, all Kriegel claims they succeed in doing (2009a, p. 52)—but they
cannot explain the mistake of a considered UIA-Skeptic who has carefully
examined her experience but is still unable to find the putative background hum of
inner awareness. Kriegel’s arguments fail to satisfy the second rule: they attribute to
the skeptic a kind of mistake when reflecting on inner awareness that she is not
otherwise disposed to make.
3.2 Four via negativa arguments against the UIA-Backer
Many UIA-Skeptics are acutely aware of the need to account for what they take to
be the phenomenological mistake of their opponents (Thomasson 2006, p. 7;
Gennaro 2008, pp. 48–49; Schear 2009, p. 101). Mehta, for instance, asks ‘…how
could Kriegel and those like him have gotten their phenomenology wrong?’ (2013,
p. 365). I consider the four main answers offered to this question but find them all
wanting. The first and second fail to offer arguments that cannot be turned around
with equal force by the UIA-Backer. The third and fourth attribute to the UIA-
Backer a kind of mistake that he is not otherwise disposed to make.
(i) Theoretical Bias One of the main problems we face when assessing the
veracity of a subject’s phenomenological reports is that those reports can be
influenced by the background theoretical commitments of the subject. As outlined in
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Sect. 1, UIA is bound up with a number of theoretical claims about consciousness.
The suggestion is that UIA-Backers have particular theoretical beliefs that skew the
way they regard their own experience.19 Kriegel, for instance, claims that his
unbiased phenomenological commitment to UIA drives his Self-Representationalist
theory of consciousness. But perhaps, instead, it is a background theoretical
commitment to Self-Representationalism that underwrites the convictions he has
about his phenomenology. On this account, the theoretical judgment that one’s
experience must always be characterised by inner awareness leads to the erroneous
phenomenological judgement that one’s experience is always characterised by inner
awareness.
It is hard to deny that theoretical commitments sometimes lead one’s
phenomenological judgements astray, so to that extent the argument from
theoretical bias has some credibility. Despite this, it is not an argument that will
help us break the phenomenological stalemate at hand. The problem is that all
parties are coming into the discussion of UIA with certain background theoretical
opinions about consciousness. So although it is credible that UIA-Backers are
making theoretically biased phenomenological judgements, it is equally credible
that it is the judgements of the UIA-Skeptic that are biased. Some claim, for
example, that inner awareness requires a reflective act (e.g. Thomasson 2005).
Perhaps, then, the conviction that non-introspective experiences ought not to be
characterised by inner awareness leads UIA-Skeptics to the erroneous phenome-
nological judgement that their experiences are not so characterised. In other words,
the argument from theoretical bias cuts both ways, so cannot tip the balance of the
debate one way or the other.
(ii) The Fridge Light Fallacy Whenever you open the fridge door you find that
the fridge light is on. From this you might infer that the fridge light is always on,
even when the door is closed. But, of course, this inference would be mistaken as it
is the act of opening the door that makes the light turn on. The proposal is that
investigating whether we are aware of our conscious states can lead us to make an
analogously fallacious inference. Schear argues:
…to reflect on the structure and character of our own experience is an
intensely self-conscious enterprise. As soon as we’ve set off on the
investigation, we’ve ‘‘opened the refrigerator.’’ Unsurprisingly, self-con-
sciousness turns up wherever we look. And then we proceed to call it ‘‘pre-
reflective’’ to ease the pangs of our guilty phenomenological conscience.
(2009, p. 101)
Whenever we introspect we find an experience that is clearly characterised by an
inner awareness of that very experience. From this, the UIA-Backer infers that his
non-introspective experiences must also involve inner awareness, albeit in an
attenuated form. But what he should have recognised is that the very act of
19 I take it that this via negativa argument is implicit when UIA-Skeptics suggest that belief in UIA is
driven by particular theoretical mistakes (e.g. Thomasson 2006, p. 7).
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introspection is what introduced inner awareness into his experience, meaning the
inference is mistaken.20
As with the argument from theoretical bias, this proposal identifies a kind of
mistake to which we are genuinely vulnerable. Again though, the argument fails to
break the phenomenological stalemate. UIA-Backers can simply reverse the
argument and suggest that UIA-Skeptics fail to recognise that introspection
‘switches off’ our peripheral/pre-reflective awareness. If UIA is true, there is a pre-
reflective inner awareness that all our non-introspective experiences have. Perhaps
the UIA-Skeptic makes the following mistake: whenever she introspects, she finds
only focal/reflective inner awareness and never the peripheral/pre-reflective inner
awareness posited by the UIA-Backer. From this she infers that none of her
experiences are characterised by pre-reflective inner awareness. But what she should
have recognised is that the act of introspection is what removed the peripheral/pre-
reflective inner awareness from her experience, replacing it with focal/reflective
inner awareness. This is effectively the thrust of Kriegel’s via negativa argument
from unintrospectability discussed above. Yet again, the phenomenological
stalemate persists.
(iii) The Non-Conscious/Conscious Confusion The UIA-Skeptic is free to grant
that whenever we are in a conscious state, we have a concurrent knowledge of that
conscious state. So long as the knowledge is itself non-conscious, this entails no
commitment to UIA. Perhaps the UIA-Backer is then making the following error: he
correctly recognises that he always has knowledge of his concurrent conscious state,
but mistakes this non-conscious knowledge for conscious knowledge. In other
words, when the UIA-Backer reports that inner awareness is a ubiquitous feature of
his experience, he is reading his non-conscious knowledge into his phenomenology.
This suggestion comes out explicitly in the passages from Schear discussed in Sect.
2.2.21 One of the attractions of this proposal is that it does not uncharitably suggest
that the UIA-Backer is entirely misguided in his support of UIA. Rather, he has
latched onto a genuine truth about the epistemic status of consciousness, but then
made a mistake about how best to understand this epistemic status.
The problem with this proposal is that UIA-Backers are not generally inclined to
confuse conscious and non-conscious knowledge. At any given time, Uriah Kriegel
knows his name and could report what his name is when asked. But he is not
(I assume) inclined to read this non-conscious knowledge into his experience: he
does not posit a ubiquitous peripheral name-awareness to explain his epistemic
situation. So why would he be making an analogous mistake in the case of his non-
conscious knowledge of his concurrent conscious state? As it stands, this argument
fails to offer a credible explanation of the UIA-Backer’s mistake. At best, it is an
incomplete proposal that needs to be supplemented with an account of why the UIA-
Backer is vulnerable to this mistake in the case of knowledge of consciousness and
not other cases of knowledge.
20 The same argument is made by Gennaro (2008, pp. 48–49).
21 Thomasson leans this way too (2006, p. 8) though her comments fit better with the fourth via negativa
argument discussed.
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(iv) The Disposition/Actualisation Confusion The UIA-Skeptic is free to grant
that all conscious states are introspectable, or more cautiously that all typical
conscious states of normal adult humans are introspectable. On this view, whenever
a subject is conscious she has the potential to gain an inner awareness of their
concurrent conscious state. But this disposition is only actualised when we
explicitly introspect, never during our ordinary non-introspective experience.22 The
suggestion is that UIA-Backers confuse this constant dispositional property of
experience with the actualisation of that disposition, leading them to report that
inner awareness is a constant actual presence in their experience. Thomasson argues
that ‘…it is our ability to have immediate first-person knowledge of our own
experiences … that leads many to think of them as states we are continually aware
of’ (2006, p. 8). Similarly, Schear hypothesises that UIA-Backers are guilty of the
‘category mistake’ of ‘…construing the presence of a capacity for self-conscious-
ness as the actualization of that capacity in our experience of the world beyond
ourselves’ (2009, p. 99).23 Like the previous via negativa argument, this view
suggests that the UIA-Backer has got something right—he has recognised that our
capacity for inner awareness is bound up with all of our experiences. His mistake is
to misconstrue the potential presence of inner awareness as an occurrent presence.
Again, the problem with this argument is that UIA-Backers are not generally
inclined to mistake dispositional properties of experience for the actualisation of
that property. At any given time, Dan Zahavi has the potential to report on his
concurrent experience. But he is not (I assume) inclined to say that this potential is
in some way actualised for all experiences: he does not, for instance, suggest that all
experiences are accompanied by a background inner monologue describing that
very conscious state. So why would he be making an analogous mistake in the case
of his potential to gain inner awareness of his concurrent experience? The proposed
explanation is at best incomplete. Interestingly, Schear recognises that there’s some
further explaining to do here, so cites the fridge light fallacy to explain why UIA-
Backers are vulnerable to a category mistake regarding inner awareness that they
wouldn’t otherwise be inclined to make (2009, p. 101). As we have already seen
though, the appeal to the fridge light fallacy fails to yield any dialectical traction.
Yet again, the UIA-Skeptic is being far too uncharitable in her portrayal of the UIA-
Backer, and so fails to offer a serious explanation of his phenomenological
intuitions.
4 An alternative model of inner awareness
Faced with a phenomenological disagreement over the ubiquity of inner awareness,
UIA-Backers and UIA-Skeptics have each put forward a range of arguments
22 This is compatible with the subject always having an occurrent non-conscious knowledge of her
concurrent conscious state, though this is by no means a commitment of the proposal under consideration.
23 Mehta puts forward a subtly different proposal in the same vein when he suggests ‘…it is easy to
become confused between being aware of the properties which put me in a position to become aware of
my experience, and actually being aware of my experience’ (2013, p. 369).
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designed to resolve the dispute. Having surveyed these arguments, it is clear that
none of them has the dialectical purchase needed to break the phenomenological
stalemate. In this section I attempt to break the stalemate by introducing an
alternative model of inner awareness. The first sub-section makes a proposal about
the place of inner awareness in our phenomenology. The second sub-section
addresses three potential objections to this proposal. The third sub-section suggests
that this proposal offers a compromise position that accommodates some of the key
claims made by each camp, and shows how it is equipped to offer a credible and
charitable explanation of why the entrenched camps get their own phenomenology
wrong.
4.1 The Affordance Model
If we wish to give a rich and accurate description of our phenomenology, we need to
have the notion of affordances in our conceptual toolbox. When we perceive the
world we are not merely passive spectators but rather active participants. Our
potential to engage with our environment figures in our perceptual experience. The
ball is not just given to us as red and round, it is given to us as kickable. We don’t
just experience the traffic light as green, we experience it as inviting acceleration.
We don’t just perceive Justin Bieber’s face as babyish and self-satisfied, we
perceive it as slappable. In all these cases, the object we perceive appears to afford a
certain action—eating, kicking and slapping respectively. Our opportunity to
perform these acts figures in our experience: there is a manifest phenomenological
difference between just seeing the ball and seeing it as kickable.
Our phenomenology is coloured by apparent affordances.24 As with any apparent
property, the appearance of an affordance is doubly dissociable from the actual
presence of that affordance. You can be in a position to perform an act without this
opportunity being apparent to you: you can be in a position to kick a ball without
experiencing it as kickable. Conversely, in a non-veridical experience of an
affordance, an opportunity to act seems to be available to you when it is not: a ball
that seems kickable might actually be made of lead. As with perceptual appearances,
experiencing an affordance should not be conflated with judging there to be an
opportunity for action. Believing that you can kick an object is one thing, but
experiencing it as kickable is quite another. Merely attributing the belief to a subject
would fail to capture how kickability figures in her phenomenology. This comes out
24 The term ‘affordance’ was introduced by Gibson (1979). On Gibson’s view, to perceive an affordance
is to stand in a direct non-representational ‘pick up’ relation to it. This controversial view of perception is
difficult to unpack and hard to defend. Fortunately though, Gibson’s concept of affordances is easily
decoupled from his idiosyncratic view of perception (Scarantino 2003, p. 954; Prosser 2011, p. 481).
Following Prosser (2011), Siegel (2014) and others I will assume that perceptual experiences are
representational, and that an affordance contributes to our phenomenology just in case our perceptual
state represents the presence of that affordance. This is not the only way in which my understanding of
affordances will diverge from Gibson’s. I would note, though, that Gibson himself regarded the concept
of affordances as open to improvements (see Sheehy 2004 quoted in Jenkins 2008, p. 43) and that current
commentators still regard the meaning of the term as somewhat up for grabs (Scarantino 2003, p. 949;
Jenkins 2008, p. 43). As such, I will not worry about the extent to which my understanding of affordances
qualifies as ‘Gibsonian’.
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when we consider the possibility of experiencing the ball as kickable whilst
simultaneously judging it not to be. Affordances also shouldn’t be conflated with
imaginings. You don’t have a perceptual experience of the ball plus an imaginative
experience of yourself kicking the ball. Rather, the kickability of the ball figures
immanently in your experience of the ball itself.25
Our experience of affordances can vary depending on the skills we have
acquired. For instance, we begin to experience the green traffic light as inviting
acceleration only after acquiring the ability to drive.26 By contrast, affordances of
grasping are often thought to figure in the perceptual experience of neonates. Our
experience of affordances can also vary depending on the extent to which our
environment solicits us to act (see Siegel 2014). Perhaps a collection of balls before
you each seem kickable, but one particularly well-placed ball calls out to be kicked,
colouring your experience in a way that the other balls do not.
Armed with the concept of affordances, we can offer a novel account of how inner
awareness figures in our ordinary non-introspective experiences. Introspection is an
action. All conscious states—or at least all ordinary conscious states of normal adult
humans—are introspectable. This is a claim that both UIA-Backers and UIA-Skeptics
seem to be able to get behind (see especially Thomasson 2005; Kriegel 2009a). My
suggestion is that this ever-present potential for introspection actually figures in our
experience. Your capacity to gain inner awareness of your concurrent conscious state
colours what it is like to be in that state for you. Although our outer awareness of the
world is not generally accompanied by an inner awareness of that very state, it is
accompanied by an awareness of the opportunity for introspection. In other words, an
affordance of introspectability is a ubiquitous feature of our phenomenology.
Thomasson comes close to this proposal when she suggests that ‘…it is a
continuous part of our experience that we are immediately able to report on such
experiences…’ (2006, p. 7). Unlike Thomasson though, my proposal concerns the
potential for introspection rather than the potential to report on one’s experience. I
am also not committed to Thomasson’s theory of how introspection and
phenomenological reports work. In fact, this ‘Affordance Model’ can be combined
with whatever is your preferred theory of introspection. So long as introspection is
an act, we can experience an affordance to introspect, regardless of the details of
what this act involves.27 The Affordance Model is also consistent with introspection
25 Some might be uncomfortable with the suggestion that affordances are perceptible properties.
Affordances should be regarded as dispositional properties (Scarantino 2003), and it could be claimed that
dispositional properties are not the kind of property we can perceive. One option here is to deny that
affordances are dispositional (Caiani 2014), but my preferred route is to accept that they are dispositional
but deny that dispositional properties are imperceptible. Perceptual experience appears to present us with
dispositional properties (including, but not limited to, affordances) so the burden of proof is on the
opposition to demonstrate that dispositional properties are, despite appearances, imperceptible.
26 For discussion of such ‘emergent’ affordances see Dotov et al. (2012). Another factor that might
influence our experience is the extent to which we have mastered a skill: the affordances presented to a
new driver will be very different to those presented to a professional racer.
27 If there is no such thing as introspection then the Affordance Model would be in trouble. I take it
though that when theorists deny the existence of introspection, what they are really rejecting are certain
naı¨ve models of how introspection works (see footnote 16 above).
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being a bundle of inter-related cognitive capacities rather than a unitary skill. If this
were the case, we should expect a collection of subtly different affordances
corresponding to the different cognitive activities.
Presumably infants and non-human animals cannot introspect. Abnormal
humans, such as blindsighters, might be attributed unintrospectable conscious
states. In normal humans the capacity for introspection might go ‘offline’ during
abnormal states of consciousness such as dreaming. In all of these cases, it is
unlikely that the subject’s experience is characterised by an affordance of
introspectability. The Affordance Model does not make a universal generalisation
about conscious states that would include such atypical experiences. It does,
however, seek to make a generalisation about all ordinary experiences of normal
adult humans. The ordinary experiences of normal adult humans are introspectable,
and the introspectability of those experiences is phenomenologically manifest to the
subject.28
4.2 Objections and replies
I will now consider three potential objections to the Affordance Model and argue
that they can each be avoided given appropriate clarification of the proposal. The
first objection is that affordances correspond to potential bodily actions. When
Justin Bieber’s face affords slapping, for instance, the phenomenology of this
experience is bound up with a specific possible movement of one’s arm. But since
there is no bodily action involved in introspection, there can be no affordance of
introspectability. Against this objection I would reply that there are many cases of
affordances for mental as opposed to bodily actions: a loud noise can afford
attention, a lecture can afford concentration, and a statement can afford contem-
plation. Affordances of introspection are members of a larger group of cognitive
affordances. A critic might respond that these cases cannot properly be described as
‘affordances’. However, the notion of cognitive affordances is not without
precedent in the literature (e.g. Scarantino 2003, p. 960). And even if the critic
insists that affordances must involve bodily actions, at this point I think we would
have a merely terminological dispute. If our capacities to introspect, attend,
concentrate and contemplate can colour our phenomenology even when we are not
deploying those capacities, then the phenomenological features in question are
affordances in every way that matters to me. If there are technical reasons to regard
them as features analogous to affordances rather than as affordances-proper, the real
content of my proposal would be unaffected.
The second objection concerns the sophistication that an affordance of
introspectability would need to have. To be aware of our capacity to introspect,
we would need to be aware of ourselves as agents with the ability to reflect on our
experience. But in ordinary experience we are not aware of ourselves, or at least not
aware of ourselves in any sophisticated way. Therefore in ordinary experience we
28 When we introspect, our introspective experience can itself be introspected. As such, I am open to the
possibility that even introspective experiences are characterised by an affordance of introspectability,
though little seems to ride on this.
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are not aware of our capacity to introspect. This objection rests on an excessively
intellectualised understanding of affordances. The ball can seem kickable without
you forming any sophisticated judgment about yourself as a potential kicker. In fact,
it’s quite credible that it could seem kickable even to creatures with no concept of
kicking i.e. no capacity to entertain propositions about kicking. The way that
kickability contributes to our experience is relatively unsophisticated. By the same
token, the way that introspectability contributes to our experience is also not that
sophisticated. Perhaps experiencing affordances requires us to experience ourselves
as agents—as entities that can deploy their abilities—but I don’t see any reason to
regard this as too sophisticated for ordinary non-introspective consciousness.29
The third and final objection goes a little deeper but can still be overcome. If an
act appears to be afforded to us, there must be something we are aware of which
appears to afford that action. When kicking is afforded, for example, there must be a
specific object that seems kickable to us. We never have a free-floating sense of
kickability detached from any particular apparent object. What is it, then, that
affords introspection? Here the Affordance Model seems to face a dilemma. One
option is to say that it is something in the world that affords introspection. But the
difficulty here is that external objects are not credibly introspectable. You cannot,
for instance, introspect a red ball. On this horn of the dilemma, the Affordance
Model is committed to an untenable view of introspection. The other option is to say
that the thing that affords introspection is your conscious state. You cannot
introspect a red ball, but you can introspect your experience of the red ball. But the
difficulty here is that experiencing an affordance of introspectability would then
presuppose an awareness of the state to be introspected. Consequently, if all our
experiences afford introspection then we must be aware of all our experiences. On
this horn of the dilemma, the Affordance Model thus collapses into UIA.
The dilemma trades on the following phenomenological principle: if an action u
appears to be afforded then there must be some apparent object x that appears to
afford having u done to it. I will seek to undermine this principle, thus allowing the
Affordance Model to avoid the dilemma. The easiest way to find counter-examples
to this principle is to consider acts that, unlike kicking or slapping, are not directed
at an object. Dancing, for example, is not something we do to an object (Siegel
2014). Accordingly, when dancing appears to be afforded there is no object that
appears to afford having dancing done to it. When you experience an affordance to
dance in a nightclub, it is the situation—the music, the lights, the right degree of
intoxication—that presents an opportunity for dancing. My suggestion is that
introspection is like dancing in this respect. We can be aware of the opportunity to
introspect in our current situation without having to be aware of any object as a
29 A critic might insist that experiences of affordances must be underwritten by exclusively low-level
psychological processes. Since awareness of our ability to introspect would presumably require high-level
cognitive processes, there can be no affordances of introspectability. In response I would note that there is
no reason to think that the psychological processes that underwrite awareness of affordances are uniform
(see Scarantino 2003, pp. 960–961). The perception of classic affordances like kickability might be
accounted for entirely in terms of low-level processes, while other affordances like introspectability
involve high-level processing.
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thing to be introspected. Unlike with dancing, every ordinary situation presents an
opportunity for introspection which is why the affordance of introspectability is a
ubiquitous feature of our phenomenology.
Here the critic might respond that introspection is not relevantly analogous to
dancing. Dancing is a counter-example to the original phenomenological principle
because dancing is not an action directed toward an object. Introspection, however,
is directed toward an object: specifically, one’s concurrent experience. As such, we
should expect affordances of introspectability to have the same phenomenological
structure as affordances of other object-directed actions. In other words, the critic
can retreat to the following qualified version of the phenomenological principle: for
all and only object-directed actions, if an action u appears to be afforded then there
must be some apparent object x that appears to afford having u done to it. Since
introspection is indeed an object-directed action, this qualified principle suffices to
underwrite the dilemma for the Affordance Model.
My response to this objection is that even the qualified phenomenological
principle doesn’t hold. Consider the act of searching for shelter. This is clearly an
object-directed action: it is aimed toward the shelter. Presumably there are situations
in which this action is afforded, but it is implausible that being aware of this
affordance requires being aware of the object that is to be searched for. After all, a
subject can search for shelter only if she is yet to find it, but can be aware of the
shelter only once it has been found.30 I suggest that affordances of introspection are
analogous to affordances of shelter-searching. In both cases, the subject is aware of
the opportunity to perform an object-directed action without being aware of the
object in question. And in both cases, the subject only becomes aware of the object
in question if she successfully performs the afforded act. The lesson we learn from
the shelter-searching case is that if an action reveals an object to the subject, then
we should not expect experiences of an affordance to perform that act to be
characterised by an awareness of the object to be revealed. Introspection is just such
an action: performing it reveals our own experience to us. As such, we should not
expect the experience of introspectability to be characterised by a prior awareness of
the conscious state to be introspected.
4.3 The dialectical significance of the Affordance Model
Ultimately the Affordance Model is answerable to your phenomenological
reflection. If careful investigation suggests to you that this account accurately
describes your experience, then you won’t need any theoretical arguments to
30 I am assuming that the thing we are searching for is the object of our act of searching, but others might
instead think that the thing being searched is the object of our act. If this is so, it becomes more plausible
that experiencing an affordance of searching for shelter requires us to be aware of the object of our action
(viz. the thing to be searched). For instance, if I am searching for shelter in a building then I will be aware
of the building that I am searching even if I am not yet aware of the suitable sheltering place within it. It is
not quite clear how to describe such cases, but I would argue that searching can be afforded even if we are
unaware of any particular thing to be searched. When caught in stormy weather, shelter-searching can be
afforded to me even if I am wholly unaware of any particular object to search (perhaps because it’s very
dark). This would constitute a counter-example to the revised phenomenological principle.
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convince you of its truth. If no amount of investigation makes this description
plausible, then the theoretical arguments I offer may not persuade you. Neverthe-
less, it is worth considering how the Affordance Model can weigh in on the debate
between UIA-Backers and UIA-Skeptics.
One thing to note is that the Affordance Model qualifies as a UIA-Skeptic position:
it denies that all experiences of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner
awareness of that very experience. That said, standard forms of UIA-Skepticism (i.e.
all sceptical positions other than the Affordance Model) do not posit a ubiquitous
affordance of introspectability. In fact, by making such a posit the Affordance Model
reflects something of the spirit of the UIA-Backers. Overall, the Affordance Model is
best regarded as a compromise position that finds a middle ground between the UIA-
Backers and the standard UIA-Skeptics. It claims that both sides are partly right and
partly wrong, and that the truth lies somewhere between them. I hope to show that by
adopting this reconciliatory posture, the Affordance Model can gain far greater
dialectical traction than either of the two entrenched camps.
What exactly does the Affordance Model say about the merits and failings of the
two entrenched camps? It says that the UIA-Backer is right to deny that the
phenomenology of non-introspective experiences is exhausted by our outer
awareness, but wrong to say that those experiences are characterised by an
occurrent inner awareness. Occurrent inner awareness is in fact limited to episodes
of introspection. On the other hand, the standard UIA-Skeptic is right to deny that
non-introspective experience is characterised by occurrent inner awareness, but
wrong to say that the phenomenology of non-introspective experience is exhausted
by outer awareness, with inner awareness making no contribution to our experience.
Although inner awareness is not always present, its potential to be brought into
presence is in fact a ubiquitous feature of experience.
Now, since the Affordance Model says that both of the entrenched camps are partly
mistaken, it owes us an explanation of why these mistakes are made. My suggestion is
that both camps misdescribe their phenomenology because they lack the concepts
needed to provide a fully accurate description. When trying to describe our experience,
we are somewhat restricted by the phenomenological concepts with which we are
familiar. One concept that neither camp has at its disposal is that of affordances of
introspectability. Without this concept, it is easy for one’s phenomenological judgments
to be led astray. Once the UIA-Skeptic has correctly recognised that non-introspective
experiences do not involve occurrent inner awareness it is natural, though mistaken, for
them to infer that our capacity for inner awareness can have no influence on what it’s like
to undergo such experiences. Similarly, once the UIA-Backer has correctly recognised
that our capacity for inner awareness does influence what it’s like to undergo non-
introspective experiences it is natural, and again mistaken, to infer that inner awareness
is occurrently present in such experiences. Neither camp is in a position to frame the
possibility that our capacity for inner awareness contributes to our phenomenology by
presenting an affordance for us to deploy that capacity, rather than by actually being
deployed. The phenomenological descriptions offered by both camps are imperfect
approximations of the truth: they reflect people’s best effort to describe their experience
with the limited concepts at their disposal. Of course, by introducing the Affordance
Model I hope to correct this mistake.
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Throughout the paper I have contended that the arguments presented by both
UIA-Backers and standard UIA-Skeptics lack genuine dialectical force. In what
ways does the Affordance Model improve on the entrenched positions in this
regard? One of the main objections I’ve raised is that each camp fails to take the
phenomenological intuitions of their opponents seriously enough. The Affordance
Model has the advantage of taking the intuitions of both sides very seriously.
Although it says that the UIA-Backers are wrong, it regards them as closer to the
truth than the standard UIA-Skeptic regards them. Similarly, it says that the standard
UIA-Skeptics are wrong, but regards them as closer to the truth than the UIA-
Backer regards them. Like any compromise proposal, the Affordance Model
manages to avoid an excessively uncharitable view of either camp in the debate.
A further objection I’ve raised is that neither of the entrenched camps has
successfully explained why their opponents would get their own phenomenology
wrong. Specifically, I argued in Sect. 3 that none of the via negativa arguments
offered satisfy the following two rules: I) not being applicable against both camps
with equal force and; II) not attributing the opponent a kind of mistake that she is
not otherwise disposed to make. The Affordance Model holds that both camps partly
misdescribe their phenomenology because they lack the concept of affordances of
introspectability. This proposal satisfies the first rule because a critic cannot respond
that it is actually proponents of the Affordance Model who have been misled by
their more limited conceptual repertoire. The Affordance Model adds a new concept
into the existing mix, so it cannot be the case that it is proponents of the entrenched
views that actually have the richer conceptual repertoire. The Affordance Model
also satisfies the second rule. When we lack the concepts needed to fully describe a
phenomenon, we are generally vulnerable to the mistake of partly misdescribing
that phenomenon. Specifically, we are all disposed to make the mistake of offering
imperfect approximations of the truth using the concepts at our disposal.
Consequently, the Affordance Model does not attribute either camp a kind of error
that they are not otherwise disposed to make. In fact, it charitably suggests that the
mistakes made by all parties are relatively innocent. Overall then, the Affordance
Model is in a far better position to explain the mistakes of its opponents then either
of the entrenched camps is.31
31 An interesting further possibility is that the Affordance Model can be used to supplement some of the
more promising via negativa arguments already on offer. The fourth via negativa argument offered by the
UIA-Skeptics in Sect. 3 suggested that UIA-Backers confuse the ubiquitous potential for inner awareness
with the ubiquitous actualisation of that potential. My objection to this argument is that the skeptic fails
to explain why the UIA-Backer would confuse a dispositional property for its actualisation when he is not
otherwise inclined to make this mistake. The Affordance Model may be able to answer that question:
apparent affordances are occurrent categorical features of your phenomenology. Confusingly though,
these categorical occurrent properties represent the presence of some dispositional property. For instance,
it is a categorical feature of your experience that it presents the ball to you as kickable, but what this
represents is the potential for kicking and not the actualisation of that potential. So perhaps the UIA-
Backer has noticed the following phenomenon—the categorical presence of a property representing their
potential to gain inner awareness—but misdescribed it as the categorical presence of inner awareness.
Unlike other dispositional properties of experience, introspectability has an occurrent phenomenological
proxy in the form of an affordance, and it is this that makes the UIA-Backer vulnerable to a category
mistake that he wouldn’t otherwise make.
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Does this explanation of where the entrenched camps have gone wrong commit
me to the prediction that on reading this paper they will immediately see the error of
their ways and become card-carrying supporters of the Affordance Model? I am not
optimistic about the prospects of this ambitious prediction, but fortunately the
Affordance Model is not committed to such a forecast. Sometimes people do not
abandon their mistaken judgements even when the source of their mistake is
correctly identified and a superior alternative position is presented to them. If
proponents of the standard views do not abandon their positions when presented
with the Affordance Model, this would be quite consistent with the model having
diagnosed their mistakes accurately. Perhaps the Affordance Model could be asked
to provide a further explanation here—an account not just of why people make their
initial mistaken judgement but of why they retain it after it has been undermined.
Such a further explanation should not be hard to come by. Perhaps proponents of the
standard views are too entrenched in their mistaken ways of thinking to recognise
the value of the alternative with which they are presented. Philosophy is replete with
cases of this kind. Or perhaps they don’t yet have a sufficient understanding of the
alternative view to see its truth. As we have already seen, it is difficult to capture
what an affordance of introspectability would be like, so dissenters could easily be
looking for the wrong thing in their experience.
The question of whether inner awareness is ubiquitous has led to a recalcitrant
phenomenological disagreement. Both sides of the dispute have tried to break this
stalemate by deploying a number of arguments against their opponents, but we have
seen that none of these arguments has any real dialectical purchase. Transcending
these entrenched positions, the Affordance Model offers a fresh account of the
relationship between our capacity for inner awareness and the phenomenology of
non-introspective experience. At the very least this model offers a new avenue of
enquiry. Beyond that though, I hope to have shown that it has significant dialectical
advantages over its competitors. It offers a compromise position that respects the
driving phenomenological insights of both camps, and provides a charitable
explanation of where each side has been led astray.
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